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JUDICIAL NOTICE -

THE ILLINOIS ANOMALY!

by HARRY G. FINS*
INTRODUCTION

Judicial notice is a doctrine which requires a court to
treat as established evidence in the case "those facts which are
a matter of common and general knowledge and which are
established and known within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court."' In this context, no problem arises when a court
takes judicial notice of well known geographical or social facts.
However, judicial notice of court proceedings and state or
municipal records presents difficulties deserving the attention
of the Illinois General Assembly, for the Illinois courts follow
opposing standards in the application of the doctrine of judicial
notice. At the trial level, the scope is very narrow; on review,
the scope is broad.
An Illinois trial judge may take judicial notice of the records in a pending case over which he is presiding. By statute,"
he is required to take judicial notice of the statutes and common
law of other states and of the municipal or county ordinances
within the jurisdiction of his court. He may not take judicial
notice of other proceedings in the same trial court, or of municipal or county ordinances outside the territorial limits of his
court. These limitations upon Illinois trial courts constitute an
inconsistency which has long been in need of correction. Under
the home rule provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, ' this
incongruity becomes even more apparent, since greater autonomy is granted to local governmental units. Subject to
preemption by the General Assembly, municipal and county
* Ph.B., J.D.
Author of numerous books and treatises on Illinois and
federal practice and procedure.
Contributor of articles to various law
reviews and legal publications. Lecturer in Post-Graduate Division of The
John Marshall Law School (1939-49), and at Lawyers Post Graduate
Clinics (1949-54).
Member of Joint Committee on Implementation of the
Judicial Amendment (1961-65) and member of the Special Committee on
Implementation of the Illinois Constitution (1971-74). One of the draftsmen
of the Illinois Administrative Review Act of 1945 and of the 1963 and
1972 amendments thereto, and one of the draftsmen of the 1963-73 amendments to the Illinois Civil Practice Act. Draftsman of numerous bills to

coordinate Illinois statutes with constitutional provisions and Supreme Court
Rules (1962-74).
'Palmer v. Mitchell, 57 Ill. App. 2d 160, 167, 206 N.E.2d 776, 779

(1965); accord, Sundene v. Koppenhoefer, 343 Ill. App. 164, 98 N.E.2d 538
(1951); Sproul v. Springman, 316 Ill. 271, 147 N.E. 131 (1925).
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 48a (1973).
To the same effect is Ashland
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Aetna Ins. Co., Ill. App. Ct., 1st Dist. No. 56473,
decided
February 19, 1974.
3
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (1970).
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ordinances of home rule units are treated equivalently with state
statutes, within the territorial confines of their governmental
unit. Nevertheless, while Illinois trial courts are prohibited from
taking judicial notice of these ordinances existing in Illinois ordinances which are as binding and applicable as statutes these same trial courts are bound to take judicial notice of
statutes existing in other states.
On the appellate level the application of the doctrine is
markedly different. A reviewing court takes judicial notice of
the case immediately before it, as well as of other cases pending
in or decided by that court, and of trial court or administrative
agency proceedings pertinent to the case before the reviewing
tribunal.
The broad discretion permitted Illinois appellate courts in
taking judicial notice, contrasted with the limitations imposed
upon trial courts, presents an anomaly in the Illinois procedural
system. The distinctions between courts of original and appellate jurisdiction do not provide logical grounds for these
inconsistencies, particularly in considering the statutory command to take judicial notice of state laws outside the territorial
limits of any Illinois court. This anomaly should be eliminated
by expanding, through legislative enactment, the scope of judicial
notice at the trial level.
NARROW SCOPE IN TRIAL COURT

Although a trial judge takes judicial notice of the records
in a pending case over which he is presiding, he is not permitted
to take judicial notice of the records of any other proceeding in
the same trial court, even where the facts and circumstances of
such other proceeding are within the personal knowledge of the
presiding judge. As a general rule, "[r]ecord proof is required
' 4
in all . . . cases, unless the [facts are] properly admitted.
Under present law, a trial court is precluded from taking judicial
notice of a prior proceeding, even though a subsequent proceed5
ing involves the same parties and the same subject matter.
4 Streeter v. Streeter, 43 Ill. 155, 164 (1867). The parties had previously
been divorced in the same court. The court refused to take judicial notice
of this fact. The court stated:
We do not admit the court could take judicial notice of the fact that
the parties were divorced, even if the decree of divorce was pronounced
by the court trying these issues. Record proof is required in all such

cases, unless the fact be properly admitted. The court or judge who
granted the divorce is not permitted to call in requisition his own

personal knowledge or recollection of the fact that such a decree
had passed at any time.
Id. at 164.
5See People v. Carr, 265 Ill. 220, 106 N.E. 801 (1914), where the
court said:
The case at bar is not the same proceeding as either of the two former
Carr cases although it is between the same parties and involves the
same subject matter, and the county court therefore could not take
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This incongruous rule emanates from a rationale which considers facts from a prior proceeding - facts known to the
parties and"to the court in the pending action - as being
within the personal knowledge of the court only. Since these
facts are not common and general knowledge, they fall outside
the scope of the doctrine, and record proof is required.Trial courts in Illinois have attempted to avoid such a
narrow application of the doctrine whenever possible. In State

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Grebner,7 the plaintiff
attached the pleadings from a prior case to his complaint as an
exhibit in the pending action. The Illinois Appellate Court,
Second District, recognized the above mentioned rule that a
trial court may not take judicial notice of prior proceedings in

a separate case in the same court, even though the facts are
within the personal knowledge of the presiding judge. The
reviewing court, however, distinguished the case from others involving a similar issue by holding that since the pleadings of the

prior case were attached to the complaint as an exhibit, they
were, therefore, before the trial court for all purposes. 8

To state that, for purposes of judicial notice, the simple
judicial notice of the contents of the record in either of the two former
cases. A court will take judicial notice of ifs own records and thus
dispense with proof identifying such records, but it will not take
judicial notice of the contents of any of its records except the one in
the proceeding before it.
Id. at 229, 106 N.E. at 804. Accord, People v. McKinlay, 367 Ill. 504, 11
N.E.2d 933 (1937) ; People v. Hunt, 357 Ill. 39, 190 N.E. 809 (1934)
Donner v. Bd. of Highway Comm'rs, 278 111.189, 115 N.E. 831 (1917).
6 In Palmer v. Mitchell, 57 Ill. App. 2d 160, 206 N.E.2d 776 (1965), the
Appellate Court, First District, stated:
Finally, it was error for the trial judge to take judicial notice of
certain evidence which had been heard in the trial of the principal case.
The doctrine of judicial notice operates to admit into evidence, without
formal proof, those facts which are a matter of common and general
knowledge and which are established and known within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court ....

The facts of which the trial judge took

judicial notice do not meet this requirement; indeed the facts which the
trial judge had heard in the trial of the principal case were not a
matter of common and general knowledge, but were within his personal
knowledge only. Moreover, while courts take judicial notice of their
records in a pending case, they cannot do so with respect to records
of other proceedings.
Id. at 167, 206 N.E.2d at 779 (citations omitted).
7 132 Ill. App. 2d 234, 269 N.E.2d 337 (1971).
8Accord, In re Estate of Fornof, 96 Ill. App. 2d 260, 238 N.E.2d 240
(1968), where the Appellate Court, Fourth District, said:
While courts take judicial notice of their records in a pending case,
they cannot do so in respect to records of other proceedings even where
the facts are within the personal knowledge of the court .... Counsel

for appellants urged that City of East St. Louis v. Touchette, 14 Ill.
2d 243, 150 N.E.2d 178, and Borin v. Borin, 335 Ill. App. 450, 82 N.E.2d
70 control. Neither case supports the view. In Touchette the documents
in issue had been admitted into evidence as exhibits in the pending
suit. In Borin the authority is confined to the pending case for the
matters at issue upon an amended complaint were raised in the original
complaint.
Id. at 264, 238 N.E.2d at 243.

is
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tactical maneuver of appending the pleadings of a prior proceeding to the complaint in a subsequent action will always meet
with the approval of a reviewing court stretches the holding in
the Grebner case to an unwarranted extreme. But given the
propensity of trial courts toward a broader application of judicial notice, Grebner indicates that wise pleading may permit
a wider application of judicial notice at the trial level than
would otherwise be possible.
BROAD SCOPE IN REVIEWING COURT

Reviewing courts take judicial notice of proceedings in
other cases pending in or decided by the reviewing court and
also take judicial notice of trial court and administrative agency
proceedings in related matters. 9 Illinois courts of review have
reiterated this rule to the point where it is now established law.
Reviewing Court Proceedings
In Blyman v. Shelby Loan & Trust Co.,10 a case involving

the partition of real estate, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
It may be further observed that there is pending in this court
an appeal, No. 27066, from the order of the circuit court of
Shelby county of October 10, 1942, admitting to probate on a
hearing de novo, the purported will of Blyman dated February 5,
1937. Of the record in that case this court takes judicial notice. 1

The case of People v. O'Malley1 involved a criminal conviction for embezzlement, and the case of In re O'Malleyl involved a disbarment proceeding. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the latter proceeding, declared:
This court takes judicial notice of the facts stated in People v.
O'Malley, ante, p. 165, in which an opinion was adopted at the
September Term, 1949, of this
court, and in which a rehearing
4
has been denied at this term.1

The case of Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club involved an
action for an accounting of moneys due to the plaintiff in a
lease of his racing premises with the defendant corporation, and
the case of Fox v. Fox6 was
of cruelty and drunkenness.
In the complaint filed in the
Club, (8 Ill.2d 571, 572) he
Park property at $1,500,000.

an action for divorce on the ground
In the divorce case, the court said:
case of Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting
[the husband] valued the Exposition
This court will take judicial notice

" In United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1941), the Supreme Court of
the United States said "[T]here is no reason why we cannot take judicial
notice of the record in this Court of the Moscow case." Id. at 216.
to 382 Ill. 415, 47 N.E.2d 706 (1943).
1 Id. at 419-20, 47 N.E.2d at 708.
12404 Il1. 165, 88 N.E.2d 454 (1949).
1t 404 Ill. 257, 88 N.E.2d 881 (1949).
14 Id. at 258, 88 N.E.2d at 881.
15 8 Ill. 2d 571, 134 N.E.2d 806 (1956).
16 9 Ill. 2d 509, 138 N.E.2d 547 (1956).
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of its own records. (People ex rel. Holzapple v. Ragen, 2 Ill. 2d
124, 130; Lee v. Finley, 413 I1. 445, 447.)17
Futhermore, appellate application of the doctrine of judicial
notice is not limited to facts or pleadings involved in the case on
appeal, and reviewing courts will also take judicial notice of
records, briefs and abstracts filed in prior appeals.'
Trial Court Proceedings
In People v. Orr1 the defendant sought review to reverse
a conviction for armed robbery after sentencing by the Circuit
Court of Sangamon County to the Illinois State Penitentiary
for the term of his natural life. On its own motion, the Illinois
Supreme Court took cognizance of trial court proceedings
initiated by the defendant:
Without suggestion of counsel, this court takes judicial notice of
the fact that the defendant, pro se, heretofore filed a petition in
the circuit court of Sangamon County, Illinois, for relief under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act. (People ex rel. Holzapple v. Regan,
2 Il1.2d 124, 130; Lee v. Finley, 413 111. 445, 447.)12
In People v. Raby 2 ' the Supreme Court of Illinois took
judicial notice of a decision by a federal district court in Illinois.22
Likewise, in People v. Young23 the Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, took judicial notice of the same federal district
4
court decision.1
In Wagner v. Fawcelt Publications2 an action was brought
in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, on the basis of diversity of citizenship, to recover for
an alleged invasion of privacy, which (under Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins26 ) required the application of Illinois law. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took
"judicial notice of certain proceedings in the Criminal Court of
Cook County, Illinois, Case No. 57-3193 People v. Robert Max

Fleig

....

"

In Jones v. Jones28 an action was filed in the United States
17 Id. at 517-18, 138 N.E.2d at 552.

isPeople v. Jefferson, 8 Il. App. 3d 839, 291 N.E.2d 223 (1972)
Cohen v. Receivable Finance Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 869, 288 N.E.2d 894 (1972)
Briskin v. Briskin Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 740, 286 N.E.2d 571
(1972) ; People ex rel. Maeras v. C. B. & Q. R.R., 36 Ill. 2d 585, 224 N.E.2d
248 (1967).
19 10 I1. 2d 95, 139 N.E.2d 212 (1956).
20 Id. at 99, 139 N.E.2d at 215.
21 40 Il. 2d 392, 240 N.E.2d 595 (1968).
22 Id. at 398-99, 240 N.E.2d at 599.
The opinion of the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois which the court took judicial
notice of, was that in Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill.,
1968).
23 100 Ill.
App. 2d 20, 241 N.E.2d 587 (1968).
'4Id. at 24, 241 N.E.2d at 589.
25 307 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963).
26 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27307 F.2d 409, 411 (1962).
28410 F.2d 365 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970).
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District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and, on
review thereof, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit said:
The Court takes judicial notice of a series of legal actions between the Jones' in the Illinois courts beginning in the middle
1950's. Plaintiff-appellant Jones and defendant-appellee Jones were
husband and wife and the various actions filed dealt with their
marital matters.2 9

In a recent indemnity action- wherein plaintiff sought
recovery of sums paid in settlement to the estates of four individuals killed in a collision between the car in which they were
riding and a truck operated by plaintiff's insured, the court, in a
footnote, stated: "Plaintiff failed to introduce the complaints
into evidence, but we have chosen to take judicial notice of their
contents."

3

1

Perhaps the most pronounced indication of the broad scope
of judicial notice when applied by reviewing courts in Illinois
is the 1971 case of People v. Siglar3 2 wherein the Illinois Supreme
Court took judicial notice of an administrative custom:
The State urges that we should take judicial notice that in
Randolph County it is the custom to hold only two criminal jury
sessions each year - one in the spring and one in the fall and that when defendant moved to continue his trial from February 24, 1969, it was with full knowledge that he would not be
brought to trial until sometime in the fall of 1969. Ours is a
unified court system and this court will take judicial notice of its
records.33

Recently, the Supreme Court of Illinois considered judicial
notice extensively in Walsh v. Union Oil Co.3 4 The court summarized the application of the doctrine in Illinois by stating:
The plaintiff, citing, inter alia, People ex rel. Winkler v. Chicago
and Eastern Illinois Ry. Co., 336 Ill. 506, 519, contends that a
court cannot take judicial notice of proceedings in cases other
than the one before it. While it is often said that courts will not
judicially notice the proceedings or the record in another cause,
courts have taken judicial notice of other proceedings as where
a holding in one cause, with substantially the same parties, is
determinative of the pending case. For example, in Butler v.
Eaton, 141 U.S. 240, 35 L. Ed. 713, 11 S. Ct. 985, the Supreme
Court considered an appeal in which the trial court had based the
29 Id. at 365-66.
30 St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 12
Ill. App. 3d 165, 298 N.E.2d 289 (1973).
31 Id. at 171, 298 N.E.2d at 293. See notes 6-9 supra' and accompanying text which indicate that such an application of judicial notice by an
Illinois trial court is prohibited unless the prior pleadings have been
admitted into evidence or appended to the pleadings in the instant action.
32 49 Ill. 2d 491, 274 N.E.2d 65 (1971).
3 Id. at 495-96, 274 N.E.2d at 67; accord, Fox v. Fox, 9 11.
2d 509,
518, 138 N.E.2d 547, 552 (1956).
S4 53 111. 2d 295, 291 N.E.2d 644 (1972).
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appellant's liability on a judgment in a companion case, which the
Supreme Court had subsequently reversed. The court observed
that if only the record in the case before it were to be considered,
there was no error, but it said that its decision in the other case
had rendered void the whole basis of the appellant's defense in the
case pending before the court. The court questioned: 'Are we
then bound to affirm the judgment and send it back for ulterior
proceedings in the court below, or may we, having the judgment
before us, and under our control for affirmance, reversal or modification, and having judicial knowledge of the total present insufficiency of the ground which supports it, set it aside as devoid
of any legal basis, and give such judgment in the case as would
and ought to be rendered upon a writ of error ... or other proper
proceedings for revoking a judgment which has become invalid
from some extraneous matter? ...It is apparent from an inspection
of the record that the whole foundation of that part of the judgment which is in favor of the defendant is, to our judicial knowledge, without any validity, force or effect, and ought never to have
come
existed. . . . Upon full consideration of the matter we have
35
to the conclusion that we may dispose of the case here.'
Recently, the Appellate Court for the First District summarized the situation as follows:
First, that judges ought not to be more ignorant than the
rest of mankind; that courts should at least know what everyone
else knows;
Second, that courts must read pleadings as though containing
a statement of all matters of which they are required to take
judicial notice, even when the pleadings contain express allegations
to the contrary; and
Third, that the failure or even refusal of a trial court to take
of a fact does not prevent an appellate court from
judicial notice
36
doing so.
Administrative Agency Proceedings
In Nordine v. Illinois Power Co., 37 the Supreme Court of
Illinois commanded that Illinois reviewing courts take judicial
notice of the orders and decisions of administrative agencies.
The court said that "[o]rders and decisions of the Illinois Public
Utilities Commission (now Illinois Commerce Commission) are
public records, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 111 2/3, par. 8) and
as such we take judicial notice of them."3 8
More recently, in People ex rel. Newdelman v. Weaver,39
the Supreme Court of Illinois reiterated that view by applying
Id. at 299-300, 291 N.E.2d at 647.
App. 3d 841, 854,
Wheeler v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 11 Ill.
298 N.E.2d 329, 338 (1973).
3732 Ill.2d 421, 206 N.E.2d 709 (1965).
38id. at 428, 206 N.E.2d at 713. Cf. Department of Pub. Welfare v.
Bohleber, 21 Ill. 2d 587, 173 N.E.2d 457 (1961); Gadlin v. Auditor of Pub.
Accounts, 414 I1. 89, 110 N.E.2d 234 (1953); Scofield v. Bd. of Educ.,
411 Ill. 11, 103 N.E.2d 640 (1952).
2d 237, 278 N.E.2d 81 (1972).
39 50 Ill.
35

36
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the doctrine in accordance with the rule announced in the
Nordine case:
After the appeal in the matter before us was filed, the Illinois
Director, in compliance with the holding in Figures v. Swank,
issued a directive in which he changed his policy and authorized
the furnishing of security deposits in proper cases. Though the
directive does not appear in the record here, it can be judicially
noticed.,.
In American National Bank and Trust Co. v. City of
Chicago,41 it was held that not only were administrative agency
proceedings, orders and decisions matters appropriate to judicial
notice, but under certain circumstances, ordinances, decisions
and rulings of municipalities were also to be judicially noticed:
In December of 1969, almost a year after the trial in this case,
and while this appeal was pending, the plaintiff submitted to the
Chicago City Council an application for a change in the zoning
classification of the subject property from R-4 to R-5. This application was denied. These facts were made a part of the brief filed
by the plaintiff in this Court irregardless [sic] of the fact that they
were not a part of the record in the trial court proceedings. The
obvious reason that these events concerning the additional application were not of record was that they had not yet occurred at
the time of trial. The defendant in its brief has responded to the
plaintiff's inclusion of these matters. Although this Court may
not normally consider matters de hors the record, we will, for the
purposes of clarity, take judicial notice of this belated application
and the action of the City Council thereon. We are able to do this
since the ordinances, decisions and rulings of the City Council are
matters of public
record, and as such this Court may take judicial
2
notice thereof.

In response to a recent challenge that Illinois courts of
review had expanded the scope of judicial notice at the appellate
level beyond its proper dimensions, the Illinois Supreme Court,
in Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,13 stated:
The Commission argues that its orders in those cases which it
considered subsequent to its decision of this case are not included
in the record, are "dehors the record," are not appropriate subjects
of judicial notice, and may not, therefore, be considered by this
court. Concerning the Commission's contention that this court
may not take notice of its actions in proceedings subsequent to the
one under review, we are of the opinion that as a tribunal charged
with the duty to review the orders of the Commission this court
is not required either by constitutional limitation [or] precedent
to perform its judicial functions in a vacuum, and is free to notice
those matters which cast light on the issues presented, particularly when, as here, the litigants and numerous amici have been
given the opportunity to present briefs and argument on the
"0Id. at 240-41, 278 N.E.2d at 83.
414 111. App. 3d 127, 280 N.E.2d 567 (1971).
42

Id. at 129-30, 280 N.E.2d at 569.

4155 Ill. 2d 461, 303 N.E.2d 364, 368 (1973).

19731

Judicial Notice in lllinois

23

precise question to which the subsequent orders of the Commission relate."
Illinois reviewing courts also take judicial notice of Board
of Review decisions as to unemployment compensation 4', and of
the records of the Department of Corrections, Pardon and
Parole Board. 4 3 In Mystic Tape v. Illinois Pollution Control
Board'1 the reviewing court took judicial notice of numerous
decisions of the Illinois Control Board.
COMMON LAW AND STATUTES OF OTHER STATES

The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, which
was enacted in Illinois in 1939, provides in section 1 thereof:
Every court of this state shall take judicial notice of the
common law and statutes of every state, territory and other
jurisdiction of the United States.",
By virtue of the above statute, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in
Moscov v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.,49 took judicial notice of
the common law of Pennsylvania. In Hyatt v. Cox, 50 the court
said: "The trial court and this court are required by statute to
take judicial notice of the case law of our sister states. Ill. Rev.
Stats. 1961, c51, § 48b and § 48g. '"
ILLINOIS JUDICIAL NOTICE STATUTE
Section 1 of "An Act in relation to judicial notice" provides:
Every court of original jurisdiction, in addition to the matters
of which courts of original jurisdiction have heretofore been required to take judicial notice, shall take judicial notice of the
following:
First. All general ordinances of every municipal corporation
within the city, county, judicial circuit or other territory for
which such court has been established, or within the city, county
or judicial circuit from which a case has been brought to such
court by change of venue or otherwise.
Second. All ordinances of every county within the county,
judicial circuit or other territory for which such court has been
established, or within the county or judicial circuit from which a
case has been brought to such court by change of venue or otherwise.
44 Id. at 468, 303 N.E.2d at 368.
45 Roundtree v. Bd. of Review, 4 Ill.
App. 3d 695, 281 N.E.2d 360

(1972). Accord, Huggins v. Bd. of Review, 10 Ill. App. 3d 140, 294 N.E.2d
32 (1973).
46 People v. Bryan, 5 Il1. App. 3d 1006, 284 N.E.2d 706 (1972).
See
also People v. Dupree, No. 56208, 1st Dist. (decided January 2, 1974).
47 No. 58600, 1st Dist. (decided December 28, 1973).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 48(g) (1973).
49 387 Ill. 378, 56 N.E.2d 399 (1944).
48

50 57 Ill. App. 2d 293, 206 N.E.2d 260 (1965).
51

Id. at 297, 206 N.E.2d at 262.
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Third. All laws of a public nature enacted by any state or
territory of the United States.
Fourth. All rules of practice in force in the court from which
a case has been transferred by change of venue or otherwise. 5
This section of the present Illinois statute is inadequate and
should be amended for several reasons.
Home rule under the 1970 Illinois Constitution places county
and municipal ordinances on a level almost equal to state
statutes. 3 Since the Illinois courts take judicial notice of the
common law and statutory law of all the fifty states, there is no
reason why Illinois circuit courts should not take judicial notice
of the ordinances of Illinois counties and municipalities or governmental units outside the geographical boundaries of the court.
Likewise, there is no reason why the circuit courts should not
take judicial notice of other cases pending or disposed of in
their own courts or in other Illinois courts and of administrative decisions and public records in Illinois in precisely the same
manner as Illinois reviewing courts do.
Furthermore, where a complaint alleges that the plaintiff
is a corporation by virtue of a corporate charter issued on a specified date by the Illinois Secretary of State, the truth of this
allegation is to be determined by a public record, which fact
can be verified by a telephone call. Why should anything else be
necessary to prove this fact? The same is true of a foreign
corporation which is licensed to do business in Illinois. The same
is true of a security interest recorded with the Illinois Secretary
of State under the Uniform Commercial Code or the Illinois
Vehicle Code, and, likewise, the same is true of a deed or mortgage recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds in the county.
These facts can be verified by merely looking at the original
document or a microfilm of it in the appropriate office.
In section 1 of "An Act in relation to judicial notice,"
quoted above, the "First" and "Second" clauses are too narrow
and should be broadened. The "Third" clause is superseded by
section 1 of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act,
quoted above. The "Fourth" clause is too limited and should
also be broadened.
Section 2 of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
Act provides: "The court may inform itself of such laws in
such manner as it may deem proper, and the court may call
upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such information. ' 54 A similar
52

ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 51, § 48(a) (1971).

53 See City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Chicago,
16 Ill. App. 3d 23, 305 N.E.2d 639 (1973), rehearing denied, January 2,
1974.54
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 48(h) (1971.)
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provision should be included with regard to ordinances, public
records and rules of practice.
To bring about the appropriate improvements in the law,
the following bill is proposed:
An Act to amend Section 1 of "An Act in relation to judicial
notice", approved June 1, 1929, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:
Section 1 of "An Act in relation to judicial notice", approved
June 1, 1929, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Every court of original jurisdiction, in addition to
the matters of which courts of original jurisdiction have heretofore been required to take judicial notice, shall take judicial
notice of the following:
First. All gener-l ordheiaeeo of. every mun.ioipa4 o4-poraw-t4i-n
-iof the ei-yr eonty - .j--uieiaI eireuit .9- ether- te-r-ri-ty
fer- whieh- sue. eoi*rt hee been- esta"iehed or- withiff the e4ty,
eoi±t- et j,4ieeia eiretti- from wh44 a- ease hoe been breuht
-t te4 eourt by. ehafige of. vem-ue et
.the-wie.
All ordinances
of "municipalities" and of "units of local government" (as defined by Section 1 of Article VII of the Constitution) and of
school districts in this State.
Second. A4 er-din ees. of. eer eemty- with6i.n. the coiP;tyjidtieial ereu-ie-t ef, othe- ter-pite fer w4k-h
i4Reh eeur4 hah beor
estohe ,. e. withii the eomty- e. jdeia4. ekeqit fT* Wh4eha- ease h-as. beef. betght- by- fueh eourt, by- ehf ge. ef venie o*
,therwiser. All cases pending in or disposed of in any court or
administrative agency in this State.
Third. All- law& e a- piblie. natA*e eneted, by a*y tate,
eo. ter-itepy of the U-ite4 States. All public records in this
State.
Fourth. All rules of practice in f.ee !i the ou-ur-t from.
wiek- a- ease has. been- temesfeffred- by ehange. of- ven+e @F,
ethe -ei-,, any court or in any administrative agency of this
State.
The court may inform itself of the matter to be judicially noticed
in such manner as it may deem proper, and the court may call upon
counsel to aid it in obtaining such information.
The enactment of this proposed bill or one similar to it
would help to alleviate the present burden placed on trial courts
and result in a more uniform application of the doctrine of
judicial notice in both the trial and appellate courts of this state.

